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Abstract 
We investigate whether financial openness has played a major role in the evolution of global 
imbalances over the period before the crisis of 2008. We estimate, with panel regression 
techniques, the impact of financial openness on medium run trends in current account 
imbalances for industrialized and emerging countries by using a de jure measure of financial 
openness and a de facto measure of financial openness. Nowadays, current account 
imbalances are larger in reason of higher capital mobility. Nevertheless, a large part of 
imbalances may be considered as unrelated with the evolution of macroeconomic 
fundamentals. 
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1. Introduction 
Current account imbalances have grown significantly the last fifteen years. Several factors 
have been designated, in the literature, as the main drivers of these imbalances: growth 
differentials, saving and investment rate differences, exchange rate misalignments and 
financial openness (i.e. capital account openness). 
Since the middle of the 1990s, global imbalances intensify to reach a climax before the 
financial crisis in 2006-08. These evolutions can be considered as unsustainable and they have 
been one of the underlying causes of the financial crisis as noted by Servén and Nguyen 
(2013)2. In 2006, the main contributors of these imbalances are the United States (with a 
deficit of more than 1.6 percent of world GDP), China and Asian countries and the oil 
exporters’ countries (with a joint surplus of more than 1.8 percent of world GDP) as shown in 
figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Global imbalances are a threat to the global macroeconomic stability (Blanchard and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2012). Therefore identify the main causes and drivers of these imbalances seem to be 
crucial. We estimate, with panel regression techniques, the impact of capital account openness 
on medium-term current account imbalances for industrialized and emerging countries by 
using a de jure measure of financial openness (the Chinn-Ito index of capital account 
openness, 2002) and a de facto measure of financial openness (the gross foreign assets 
measured as the sum of foreign assets and foreign liabilities). The main finding is that the 
relative financial openness (measured relatively to world average) has played a significant 
role on the magnitude of medium-term current account. By increasing the opportunities of 
overseas investments, the relative financial openness has had positive impact on medium-term 
                                                 
2 They examine the different views on the role of the global imbalances before and after the beginning of the 
crisis. 
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current account balances of industrialized countries (because of downward pressures on 
domestic investment rates). Conversely, the relative financial openness has had negative 
impact on medium-term current account balances of emerging countries (because of upward 
pressures on domestic investment rates). 
For a number of industrialized countries, the evolution of the relative financial openness 
(which has dropped since the middle of the 1980s since they have already liberalized their 
capital account and that the world average has followed an increasing trend) has had a 
negative impact on medium-term current account balances. For South-East Asian countries, 
the evolution of the relative financial openness (which has dropped since the middle of the 
1980s since these countries have liberalized their capital account more slowly than the world 
average) has had a positive impact on medium-term current account balances. This paper is 
organized as follow. Section 2 presents various approaches which have been proposed to shed 
light on the development of global imbalances since the mid-1990s. Section 3 provides 
empirical results of the current account regressions. Section 4 studies in greater details the 
contributions of each explanatory variable to the medium-term current account. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Most popular explanatory approaches of global imbalances 
Various explanations have been proposed to shed light on the surge of global imbalances 
observed since the middle of the 1990s as noted by Chinn (2013)3. We first review these 
different explanations and then we discuss the implications for our empirical work.  
 The Intertemporal approach 
The intertemporal approach is based on the behavior of rational expectation agents which 
maximize utility function under a budget constraint. They smooth consumption by borrowing 
and saving thus current consumption is equal to a discounted value of future expected net 
                                                 
3 He provides a large survey on these different approaches and the corresponding empirical findings. 
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output or net wealth. Change in expectations about future growth caused by productivity 
shocks or reductions in investment and government spending induces change in consumption. 
In this perspective, the huge deficits observed in the U.S. during the 2000s could be 
interpreted as an expectation of a productivity boom which will improve future growth 
significantly. This view could be more attractive if the GDP growth has been driven by 
investment rather than by consumption during this period. It seems that the profit motive was 
not the main reason behind the huge incoming flows in the U. S. 
 Bretton-Woods II and East Asian Mercantilism versus Self-protection 
The East Asian surpluses can be attributed to mercantilist behavior as an outcome of this 
concerted effort, the U.S. deficits have surged. Dooley et al. (2003, 2007) argue that financing 
of America’s trade deficit is an explicit quid pro quo to continued access to American 
markets. The accumulation of large amount of reserve can be explained by a precautionary 
demand or self-insurance against volatility of capital flows and macroeconomic consequences 
of sudden drop for instance and notably after the East-Asian crisis of 1997. 
 The Saving-Investment approach 
From the point of view of the national account identity, the external sector balance (the 
current account balance) can be seen as the sum of the public sector balance and the private 
sector balance: 
Y M C I G X             (1) 
If we introduce the public receipts net of transfer payments in the equation (1), we obtained 
this new relationship (equation (2)): 
[ ] [ ]CA T G S I            (2) 
With Y , gross domestic product; C , private consumption; I , private investment; G , 
government spending; X , Exports; M , Imports; [ ]S I , private sector saving-investment 
balance, CA , current account balance. 
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The issues surrounding global imbalances can be analyzed as imbalances in domestic saving 
rates and domestic investment rates in the main economic areas at world scale. These 
imbalances could have been accentuated by financial openness (i.e. openness of the capital 
account) which has increased over the period 1980 to 2003 at the world level. 
 The Global Saving Glut hypothesis 
Introduced by Bernanke (2005), Clarida (2005), the “global saving glut” hypothesis explain 
the surge of U.S. deficit during the 2000s by a financial underdevelopment of Asian emerging 
countries. These differences in financial development and financial openness have allowed 
Asian emerging countries to export their excess of saving (due to rising savings and dropping 
investments after the 1997 crisis) to the U.S. Following the oil price evolutions, the oil 
exporter has become an important provider of savings to international financial markets. In 
this view, the U.S. external imbalance is a problem made overseas. The solution is to develop 
financial system of emerging market with excess saving in order to reduce the financial flow 
to countries with better financial system. 
Our contribution includes two important differences vis-à-vis the recent works of Gruber and 
Kamin (2009) and Chinn et alii (2014). We include fixed effects in the current account 
regressions and we check the robustness of the results by using two alternative measures of 
financial openness and by estimating GMM regressions. As noted by Gruber and Kamin 
(2009), in works of Chinn and Ito, we do find that financial openness have contributed 
positively to current accounts emerging countries but they do not provide a clear explanation 
to enlighten this empirical evidence. We try to tackle this issue as Gruber and Kamin find that 
measures of financial development are not important to explain the global pattern of current 
account imbalances. 
After this brief review of the main explanatory approaches of the global imbalances 
phenomenon, we move now to the implications for our empirical investigation. The “global 
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saving glut” hypothesis focuses on differences in financial development to explain the global 
imbalances phenomenon. The reasoning implies a certain amount of openness to capital 
flows. But differences in financial openness are not a key element in the explanation. If 
countries were equally open to capital flows, differences in financial development could ever 
explain an increase of global imbalances. The problem is that financial openness has known 
important evolutions since the beginning of the 1980s. Nowadays, capital mobility is higher 
but countries are not equally open to capital flows. 
The aim of this study is to investigate the role of financial openness in the increase of global 
imbalance before the crisis of 2008. 
3. An empirical test of the role of financial openness 
As the current account equals the difference between domestic saving and investment (i.e. the 
saving-investment balance), the current account developments are examined from the 
perspective of the medium- to long-term determinants of saving and investment behaviors 
(Gruber and Kamin, 2007). According to these authors, the main determinants of the current 
account at medium term are, inter alia, the demographic characteristics, such as, the 
dependency ratios of dependent populations relative to the working age population or the 
population growth, which is expected to exert a negative influence, with a higher dependency 
ratio leading to more spending; the government budget balance, with a public deficit having a 
negative effect on the current account, but this effect may be regarded as a simple accounting 
one which has not to be introduced4. 
 
                                                 
4 Contrary to the empirical literature on economic growth, current account regressions have not major 
explanatory variables. There is a series of variables which explains a little part of the current account. The risks 
of omitted variable bias are more limited than in other areas of the empirical literature. 
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The equations of current account are estimated with panel data over the period 1980-20035 
and for two groups of countries. In a medium term perspective, we use non-overlapping four 
years average of annual data (Lee et al., 2008): 
i t i t i tCA S I             (3) 
0 1 2 3i t i t i ti t i t i tCA RPG ROG RKAOPEN                   (4) 
0 1 2 3i t i t i ti t i t i tCA RPG ROG RGFA                   (4’) 
The variables of equation (4) are defined as follows: CA , current account as % of GDP; 
RPG , relative population growth (relative to the weighted world average), as percent of the 
total population6; ROG , relative output gap (relative to the weighted world average) 
expressed as the percentage difference between actual GDP in constant prices, and estimated 
potential GDP; RKAOPEN , relative financial openness (relative to the weighted world 
average) based on the Chinn-Ito index; RGFA , relative gross foreign assets (relative to the 
weighted world average) in % of GDP measured as the sum of foreign assets and foreign 
liabilities. The sources of the different variables are presented in appendix A. 
One group is composed of 18 industrial countries (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States). The other group, 
composed of 21 emerging economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia and Turkey). The weight of these two groups in 
                                                 
5 Several robustness tests have been performed over the period spanning from 1980 to 2007 and the main 
conclusions are similar. We do not find any evidence of a structural break in the relationship between financial 
openness and current account balances as in Chinn et alii (2014). 
6 This variable is more homogeneous than dependency ratios for comparison between industrialized and 
emerging countries in reason of large differences in life expectancy and child labor. 
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the world GDP and the world trade is very large. However, as there are significantly different, 
they can hardly figure in the same panel. 
In the current account regressions for industrialized country group (table 1), the coefficients 
are significant and have the expected signs: the increase of the relative population growth (
RPG ) reduces the current account balance (because of a higher proportion of dependent 
population), the increase of the relative output gap ( ROG ) deteriorates the current account 
(via the induced imports caused by the increase of the output gap of the country relatively to 
world average). For industrialized countries, an increase of relative financial openness (
RKAOPEN  or RGFA) allows to make investment abroad more extensively. Consequently, 
there is a downward pressure on the domestic investment rate and so, this evolution has a 
positive impact on the current account7. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The sign of this coefficient express the impact of a variation financial openness on the current 
account balance. This kind of relationship is connected with the extensive literature on the 
financial openness and economic growth nexus. If financial openness enhances growth then 
the current account deteriorates because of an increase of induced imports. 
However, the survey works on this issue by Eichengreen (2001) and by Kose et al. (2006) 
reports that the literature failed to provide robust and systematic (positive) evidence between 
growth and financial openness. 
As an illustration of this last point, two recent empirical studies (Carmignani, 2008; Quinn 
and Toyoda, 2008) found different results on this issue. Carmignani (2008) argues (thanks to 
                                                 
7 In order to check this point, we replace in the regressions the current account balance by the domestic 
investment rate (see appendix A for the source of the data). We find that financial openness has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on the domestic investment rate for the industrialized countries group. Results are 
not reported for the sake of brevity but are available upon request. 
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a system estimation and a de jure measure of financial openness) that financial openness 
stimulated growth through trade openness and financial development and that the direct effect 
of financial openness on growth is negligible. 
Quinn and Toyoda (2008) found empirical evidence of positive link between financial 
openness and growth by using a de jure measure of financial openness. 
Ordinary least square (OLS) specifications with individual fixed effects raise the coefficient 
of determination. GMM panel estimators (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) show that there is no problem of endogeneity (which could 
be caused by a reverse causality, for example, deficit countries can use capital account 
liberalization in order to finance their deficit and thus delay the current account adjustment, 
endogeneity could be also caused by omitted variables) for the chosen specification in the 
current account regressions for industrialized countries group (table 2 and 5). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
For a number of industrialized countries, the RKAOPEN  variable follows a negative trend 
since the beginning of the 1980s. The RKAOPEN  variable describes the magnitude of 
financial openness relative to global average of financial openness (which corresponds to a 
weighted average8 of the KAOPEN  index (Chinn and Ito, 2006). 
Since the global average follows a positive trend since the middle of the 1980s and that many 
industrialized countries have already liberalized their capital account in early 1980s, the 
relative financial openness variable (RKAOPEN) dropped in these countries. These evolutions 
have contributed negatively to the current account since the estimated coefficient is positive 
                                                 
8 The weights are equals to the share of each country in world GDP in dollar PPP terms. More precisely, the 
more the KAOPEN index is high, the more the country is open to cross-border capital transactions. In order to 
avoid the complexity of interpreting the estimated coefficients, this variable (KAOPEN) is adjusted such that the 
minimum value is zero, i.e., they range between zero and some positive value. The demeaning of the series 
allows controlling for rest of the world effects (Chinn and Ito, 2007). 
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and statistically significant for the industrialized countries’ panel in all regressions (see 
appendix B, for the linear correlation between current account and RKAOPEN). 
In order to check the consistency of the results, we introduce an alternative measure of 
financial openness (RGFA) which corresponds to the sum of the foreign assets and foreign 
liabilities of the country relatively to world average in % of GDP. The coefficient of the 
RGFA variable9 is positive and statistically significant for the industrialized country like in 
regressions with the KAOPEN variable10. This is reassuring about the robustness of the results 
(table 3). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The results of unit root tests are available on request (several panel unit root tests have been 
used but, as the time series dimension is very short, unit roots are not a real concern). The null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected in all the series. 
In the current account regressions for emerging country group (table 4), the coefficients are 
significant and have the expected signs. Once again, OLS specifications with individual fixed 
effects raise the coefficient of determination. GMM panel estimators show that there is no 
problem of endogeneity for the chosen specification in the current account regressions (table 2 
and 5). The main difference with the current account regression for industrialized countries 
group is the sign of the coefficient of the RKAOPEN variable which is negative for emerging 
countries group (see appendix B for the linear correlation between current account and 
RKAOPEN)11. 
                                                 
9 The RGFA variable is not stationary in level so we use the variation of this variable, to avoid eventual 
fallacious regressions’ problems, but the results are similar when we use the level of this variable. 
10 A distinction between short- and long-term capital flows would be an interesting extension of this paper. 
11 The coefficient of the RPG variable is relatively higher in the SGMM estimation for the industrialized 
countries group. As most of these countries have completed the demographic transition, the variation of the RPG 
variable is limited. The mean is equal to -0.39 and the standard deviation is equal to 0.42. 
11 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
For emerging countries, an increase of relative financial openness (RKAOPEN or RGFA) 
allows to receive investments from abroad more extensively. Consequently, there is an 
upward pressure on the domestic investment rate12 and so, this evolution has a negative 
impact on the current account (Ito and Chinn, 2007). 
Once again, the de facto measure of financial openness (RGFA) is statistically significant and 
has the same sign (i.e. negative) than that of the RKAOPEN variable for the emerging 
countries group (table 6). 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
For a number of emerging countries, the RKAOPEN variable follows a negative trend since 
the beginning of the 1980s. The RKAOPEN variable describes the magnitude of financial 
openness relative to global average of financial openness (which corresponds to a weighted 
average13 of the KAOPEN index (Chinn and Ito, 2002, 2006)). 
For these countries, the drop of the relative capital openness (RKAOPEN) variable means that 
they have liberalized their capital account more slowly than the global average. These 
evolutions have contributed positively to the current account since the estimated coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant for the emerging countries’ panel in all regressions. 
  
                                                 
12 In order to check this point, we replace in the regressions the current account balance by the domestic 
investment rate (see appendix A for the source of the data). We find that financial openness has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on the domestic investment rate for the emerging countries group. Results are not 
reported for the sake of brevity but are available upon request. 
13 See note 5. 
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4. Medium run trends in current account balances 
As it been explained in the previous section, the drop of the RKAOPEN variable has induced 
an increase of the medium-term deficits in a number of industrialized countries and an 
increase of the medium-term surpluses of South-East Asia’s emerging countries. This section 
illustrates this point by studying some striking cases. 
 The United States and the United Kingdom 
The case of the United States is very interesting because it illustrates very well the case of 
countries which have totally liberalized its capital account in the early 1980s (thus the 
KAOPEN index, which is an inverse measure of capital controls, reached its upper limit). In 
addition, the global average of financial openness had increase over the period 1980 to 2003. 
These two evolutions have induced a drop of the RKAOPEN variable for the United States. 
The medium-term current account14, which was around -1.7 % at the beginning of the 1980s, 
have reached around -2.5 % at the beginning of the 2000s. In this evolution, the relative 
financial openness has played a negative role. In fact, the contribution of the RKAOPEN 
variable was near from 1.3 % in the beginning of the period was reduced to only 0.9 % 
because the domestic and foreign evolution of the financial openness which have been already 
described and because of positive coefficients of the RKAOPEN variable in the current 
account regressions for industrialized countries15. 
The case of the United Kingdom is very similar to that of the United States, in a smaller scale. 
However, the capital account was totally liberalized only at the middle of the 1980s. The 
medium-term current account have dropped to -1.7 % at the end of the period whereas it was 
                                                 
14 We use the OLS individual fixed effects specification to calculate the medium-term current account (i.e. 
equilibrium current account) for all the countries. A simple Fisher test indicates that the fixed effects are not 
redundant. In order to capture medium- to long-term trends, we set the output gaps at zero. 
15 Chinn et al. (2014) have found that the “saving glut” variables (which include capital account openness) have 
induced a reduction of the medium-term current account in the United States. 
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equal to -1 % in 1980. Once again the reduction of the relative capital openness (the 
RKAOPEN variable) has played a negative role in the evolution of the medium-term current 
account from the middle of the 1980s to the end of the period. 
 South-East Asian countries and India 
For South-East Asian’s emerging countries, the story is completely different. These countries 
have also seen the RKAOPEN variable decrease but for different reasons of those of the 
United States or the United Kingdom. The main explanation of this drop is that, globally, East 
Asian’s emerging countries have opened they capital account more slowly than the world 
average. For China , the medium-term current account have grown significantly from the 
beginning of the period (from 1% in 1980 to 2.5% in 2003) in this evolution the reduction of 
the relative population growth and the stability of the financial openness have played a 
positive role. 
The cases of Malaysia and Indonesia are similar on several points. They have increased their 
medium-term current account since the beginning of the 1980s (from around -2% in 1980 to 1 
% in 2003 for Indonesia; from 0% to 2% for Malaysia). In these evolutions the reduction of 
the relative population growth and the drop of the relative financial openness (due to the fact 
that these countries have liberalized their capital account more slowly than the world average) 
have played a positive role. 
The medium-term current accounts of Thailand and the Philippines have different profiles but, 
in these two countries, the stability of the relative financial openness has had a positive impact 
on the underlying capital flows, on the whole period. The medium-term current account, 
which was very negative in the beginning of the sample (-4% for Thailand and -2.5 % for the 
Philippines), have progressively improved to reach 0 % in Thailand and -2% in the 
Philippines. In this evolution, the depletion of the population growth has played a positive 
role. 
14 
The evolution of the relative financial openness in the South-East Asian’s emerging countries 
reflect the fact these countries have liberalized their capital account more slowly than the 
world average. This relative decrease has had a positive impact on the current for these 
countries since the coefficient associated to the RKAOPEN  variable is negative for the 
emerging countries group. 
The evolutions of the medium-term current account of India and its contributions can be 
compared to those of South-East Asian’s emerging countries. Insofar the medium-term 
current account has improved steadily during the whole period (from around -2% to around 
0%). In addition, the stability of relative financial openness has contributed positively (about 
1%) to the medium-term current account and the reduction of the dependency ratio has also 
had a positive impact but to a lesser extent than small South-East Asian countries which are 
submitted to weaker demographic constraints (comparatively to demographic giants like 
China and India). 
 Latin American countries 
The case of Latin American countries is more dispersed than those of South-East Asian 
countries over the period 1980 to 2003. For Brazil, the evolution of the relative financial 
openness has had a positive impact until the end of the 2000s. At the beginning of the 2000, 
Brazil opened his capital account more rapidly and this evolution induced a drop in the 
positive contribution of relative financial openness observed earlier. In spite of this decreasing 
evolution of financial openness, the reduction of the population growth has had a positive 
impact on the medium-term current account which has slowly improved (from -4% to -2%). 
The case of Mexico can be seen as the opposite of South-East Asian’s emerging countries 
cases. Indeed, Mexico had strongly reduced its relative capital openness after the debt crisis. 
The RKAOPEN  variable decreased until 1986 and after that the openness index increased 
steadily until the beginning of the 2000s. This evolution of relative financial openness has 
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contributed negatively to the medium-term current account from the middle of the 1980s to 
the beginning of the 2000s. In spite of this negative contribution of financial openness, the 
medium-term current account has improved strongly (from around -4% to around 0%) mainly 
thanks to favorable demographic evolution. 
Argentina is the country in which the medium-term current account has known the most 
contrasted movements mainly due to large variation in the relative financial openness. The 
medium-term current account has improved on the whole period (from -1.5% to -0.5%) but 
with large variations notably during the period of the currency board system. At the beginning 
of the currency board scheme, the relative financial openness has been more pronounced and, 
thus, the contribution of the RKAOPEN  variable which has been positive (around 1%) in 
1988-1991, became negative (around -0.3%) in 1996-1999. This evolution of the relative 
financial openness has participated to accentuate the current account deficit during the 
currency board era. After the burst of the crisis in 2001, the medium-term current account 
became less negative (about -0.5%). 
For Chile, the medium-term current account remains stable to around -4%. The relative 
financial openness is relatively stable and contributed positively to the medium-term current 
account until the beginning of the 2000s. At this moment, Chile has opened its capital account 
more rapidly and so the contribution to the medium-term current account of the RKAOPEN  
variable decreased sharply. 
For Colombia, the medium-term current account has steadily improved from -2% to -1% on 
the whole period. The stability of the relative financial openness has contributed positively 
(like in the case of South-East Asian’s emerging countries) to the medium-term current 
account. An impressive reduction of the relative population growth has, also, contributed to 
the medium-term current account progression. 
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5. Conclusion 
Global imbalances are a threat to the global macroeconomic stability. Therefore identify the 
main causes and drivers of these imbalances seem to be crucial. The objective of this paper 
was to investigate whether financial openness has played a major role in the evolution of 
global imbalances during the period preceding the crisis of 2008. 
The main finding is that the relative financial openness (measured relatively to world average) 
has played significant role on the magnitude of medium-term current account. By increasing 
the opportunities of overseas investments, the relative financial openness has had positive 
impact on medium-term current account of industrialized countries (because of downward 
pressures on domestic investment rates). Conversely, the relative financial openness has had 
negative impact on medium-term current account of emerging countries (because of upward 
pressures on domestic investment rates). For a number of industrialized countries, the relative 
financial openness has had a negative impact on medium-term current account. For South-
East Asian countries, the relative financial openness has had a positive impact on medium-
term current account. The evolution of domestic and foreign financial openness has allowed 
increasing the medium-term current account balances in absolute value. These effects of 
financial openness could be investigated in future works with non-linear econometric 
techniques as in González et al. (2005) in order to unveil new categories of asymmetries 
between countries. 
Nowadays, deficits and surpluses are larger in reason of higher capital mobility. Nevertheless, 
a large part of these imbalances may be considered as unrelated with the evolution of 
macroeconomic fundamentals. These results show that in spite of higher capital mobility, we 
should continue to prevent the return of large imbalances at the world level in order to ensure 
global macroeconomic stability. 
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Appendix A. Data source 
 
[Insert Table A1. about here] 
 
Appendix B. Correlations 
 
[Insert Figure B1. about here] 
 
[Insert Figure B2. about here] 
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Figure 1. Current account balances as percent of world GDP 
 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook, April 2012, International Monetary Fund, forecast after 2010, author’s 
calculations. 
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Table 1. Determinants of the current account for industrialized countries 
 
    OLS Pooled Individual Fixed Effects Time Fixed Effects 
Constant   -2.54***  -1.43***   -2.45*** 
    (0.09)   (0.21)    (0.37) 
Relative Population Growth -3.00***  -1.20**   -3.03*** 
    (0.28)   (0.51)    (0.61) 
Relative Output Gap  -0.37*   -0.48***   -0.39*** 
    (0.19)   (0.12)    (0.14) 
Relative Financial Openness 1.08***  0.92***   0.92*** 
    (0.15)   (0.10)    (0.25) 
Adjusted R²   0.40   0.77    0.36 
Nb. of observations  108   108    108 
Hausman Test   -   2.60    - 
       [0.45]  
Notes: The independent and dependent variables are non-overlapping 4-year averages of the corresponding 
annual variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The last row 
shows Hausman test statistics for random effects versus fixed effects specifications. The random effect 
specification and the fixed effect specification give similar results. P-values are reported in square brackets. 
Source: author’s estimates. Note that we obtain similar result over the period 1980 to 2007 in all specifications. 
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Table 2. Robustness test: Difference GMM 
 
Arellano and Bond (1991) Difference GMM  Difference GMM 
    (Industrialized)  (Emerging) 
Current Account (-1)  0.45***  0.13*** 
    (0.03)   (0.06) 
Relative Population Growth -2.55***  -2.0812% 
    (0.53)   (1.31) 
Relative Output Gap  -0.61***  -0.19* 
    (0.04)   (0.10) 
Relative Financial Openness 0.84***  -0.81*** 
    (0.17)   (0.21) 
Significant time dummies 92-95, 96-99, 00-03 96-99, 00-03 
Nb. of observations  72   84 
J-Statistic   11.95   5.22 
    [0.21]   [0.81] 
Notes: The independent and dependent variables are non-overlapping 4-year averages of the corresponding 
annual variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The last row 
show the J-statistic is the Sargan statistic for the validity of over-identifying restrictions. P-values are reported in 
square brackets. Source: author’s estimates. Note that we obtain similar result over the period 1980 to 2007 in all 
specifications. 
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Table 3. Regressions with a de facto measure of financial openness 
 
Industrialized countries  OLS Pooled Individual Fixed Effects 
Constant    -2.03*** -0.96*** 
     (0.13)  (0.23) 
Relative Population Growth  -2.57*** -0.89** 
     (0.52)  (0.39) 
Relative Output Gap   -0.56** -0.55*** 
     (0.17)  (0.11) 
Relative Gross Foreign Assets 0.01*** 0.007*** 
     (0.00)  (0.00) 
Adjusted R²     0.43  0.92 
Obs.     90  90 
Notes: The independent and dependent variables are non-overlapping 4-year averages of the corresponding 
annual variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Source: 
author’s estimates. Note that we obtain similar result over the period 1980 to 2007 in all specifications. 
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Table 4. Determinants of the current account for emerging countries 
 
    OLS Pooled Individual Fixed Effects Time Fixed Effects 
Constant   -0.97** -0.30    -1.19*** 
    (0.40)  (0.50)    (0.52) 
Relative Population Growth -1.94*** -3.21***   -1.66*** 
    (0.36)  (0.41)    (0.43) 
Relative Output Gap  -0.44*** -0.35***   -0.33*** 
    (0.06)  (0.06)    (0.10) 
Relative Financial Openness -0.47** -0.63**   -0.45* 
    (0.17)  (0.23)    (0.18) 
Adjusted R²   0.47  0.68    0.35 
Nb. of observations  126  126    126 
Hausman Test   -  9.51**    - 
      [0.02]     
Notes: The independent and dependent variables are non-overlapping 4-year averages of the corresponding 
annual variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The last row 
shows Hausman test statistics for random effects versus fixed effects specifications. The random effect 
specification and the fixed effect specification give similar results. P-values are reported in square brackets. 
Source: author’s estimates. Note that we obtain similar result over the period 1980 to 2007 in all specifications. 
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Table 5. Robustness test: System GMM 
 
Blundell and Bond (1998) System GMM  System GMM 
    (Industrialized) (Emerging) 
Current Account (-1)  0.89***  0.35** 
    (0.22)   (0.13) 
Relative Population Growth -6.65**  -0.21 
    (2.63)   (1.09) 
Relative Output Gap  -0.83***  -0.22 
    (0.27)   (0.17) 
Relative Financial Openness 1.44**   -1.01** 
    (0.67)   (0.45) 
Nb. of observations  90   105 
Nb. of instruments  17   15 
AR(1)    [0.00]   [0.02] 
AR(2)    [0.66]   [0.22] 
Sargan Test   [0.15]   [0.44] 
Hansen Test   [0.68]   [0.28] 
Notes: The independent and dependent variables are non-overlapping 4-year averages of the corresponding 
annual variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Sargan and 
Hansen test the validity of over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) correspond to the Arellano-Bond 
residual autocorrelation tests. P-values are reported in square brackets. Source: author’s estimates. Note that we 
obtain similar result over the period 1980 to 2007 in all specifications. 
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Table 6. Regressions with a de facto measure of financial openness 
 
Emerging countries   OLS Pooled Individual Fixed Effects 
Constant    -0.67  -0.71** 
     (0.48)  (0.34) 
Relative Population Growth  -1.20*** -1.53*** 
     (0.46)  (0.38) 
Relative Output Gap   -0.43*** -0.34*** 
     (0.11)  (0.05) 
 Relative Gross Foreign Assets -0.02** -0.02*** 
     (0.00)  (0.00) 
Adjusted R²    0.23  0.70 
Obs.     105  105 
Notes: The independent and dependent variables are non-overlapping 4-year averages of the corresponding 
annual variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Source: 
author’s estimates. Note that we obtain similar result over the period 1980 to 2007 in all specifications. 
  
28 
Table A1. Data source 
 
Variable Source 
Current Account  World Economic Outlook, IMF, April 2012. 
Gross Foreign Assets  P.R. Lane and G.M. Milesi-Ferretti’s database, 2009. 
National Investment  World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2011. 
Financial Openness  Chinn-Ito Index, 2010. 
Output Gap   Economic Outlook, OECD, May 2012. 
Population Growth  World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2011. 
Notes: author’s calculations for the output gap of the emerging countries. On the period 1970-2010, we use an 
HP filter on the real GDP to obtain the potential output. We select a lower smoothing parameter than in the case 
of industrialized countries in order to take in account that the business cycle is shorter in emerging countries. 
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Figure B1. Industrialized countries 
 
  
Source: author’s calculations  
 
Figure B2. Industrialized countries 
 
 
Source: author’s calculations 
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